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Abstract
We conduct an experiment with a representative sample from the US to study house-
holds’ demand for macroeconomic information. Respondents who learn of a higher
personal exposure to unemployment risk during recessions increase their demand for
an expert forecast about the likelihood of a recession. This finding is consistent with
macroeconomic models of endogenous information acquisition, according to which
the demand for information depends on its expected benefits. Moreover, respondents’
updating about their personal unemployment risk suggests that households are im-
perfectly informed about their exposure to aggregate fluctuations, which may distort
their beliefs about the benefits of acquiring macroeconomic information.
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1 Introduction
Information frictions feature a central role in many theories of expectation formation.
In some models, these frictions are assumed to be exogenous (Carroll, 2003; Klenow
and Willis, 2007; Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mankiw et al., 2003; Wiederholt, 2015; Wood-
ford, 2003). By contrast, in models of endogenous information acquisition, economic
agents with a limited capacity to acquire or process information choose how much
information to acquire depending on its expected benefits. For instance, this predic-
tion is at the core of theories of rational inattention (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009;
Maćkowiak et al., 2018; Sims, 2003), sparsity (Gabaix, 2019) or sticky information with
endogenous updating frequency (Reis, 2006).
In this paper, we test this prediction in the context of exposure to unemployment
risk during recessions, and how it affects individuals’ demand for a forecast about
the likelihood of a recession. Perceived unemployment risk plays an important role
in models of spending and saving decisions, investment choices and labor market
behavior. Higher exposure to unemployment risk during recessions should increase
the expected benefits of acquiring information about the likelihood of a recession,
as – depending on individuals’ exposure – such information should allow them to
predict their personal unemployment risk more accurately and make better economic
decisions.
Testing how information acquisition depends on exposure to macroeconomic risk
is challenging with observational data. Offering pieces of information to more and
less exposed individuals and comparing their demand for this information is prob-
lematic as those who are more exposed to macroeconomic risk should already be bet-
ter informed about pieces of news that are relevant for their macroeconomic outlook
to begin with, which may crowd out their demand for additional information. More-
over, more exposed individuals differ from less exposed individuals in many unob-
servables, such as the cost of acquiring and processing information. To circumvent
these identification challenges, we propose an experiment that exogenously varies
people’s beliefs about their own exposure to macroeconomic risk. This allows us to
compare otherwise similar individuals who hold differential beliefs about the rele-
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vance of a piece of information to themselves.
We conduct our experiment with an online sample representative of the US popu-
lation in full-time employment in terms of age, income, region, education and gender.
The experiment proceeds as follows: First, we measure respondents’ beliefs about the
effect of the Great Recession in 2008-9 on the unemployment rate among people with
similar characteristics as themselves. We then generate exogenous variation in per-
ceptions of exposure to macroeconomic risk by providing the respondents with data
on actual changes in the unemployment rate among people similar to them over the
Great Recession. Respondents are randomly assigned to receive information based on
data from either the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population
Survey (CPS). We exploit differences across the two Census surveys due to sampling
variation and procedural differences as a source of exogenous variation in the pro-
vided information. Thereafter, we elicit the respondents’ perceptions of how exposed
they personally are to unemployment risk during recessions. Finally, respondents
have to choose between receiving an expert forecast about the likelihood of a reces-
sion, a forecast about inflation, a forecast about the return on government bonds, a
forecast about government spending, or no forecast.
The main findings of our paper can be summarized as follows: First, information
about changes of the unemployment rate among similar individuals during the last
recession strongly affects respondents’ perceived risk of becoming personally unem-
ployed during the next recession, indicating that individuals are imperfectly informed
about their own risk exposure. Consistent with this, a substantial fraction of respon-
dents report that they are uncertain about their group’s exposure to macroeconomic
risk. This suggests that there exist frictions in households’ knowledge of how relevant
macroeconomic information is for themselves. Second, an exogenous increase in per-
ceived unemployment risk during the next recession increases respondents’ demand
for receiving a forecast about the likelihood of a recession, consistent with the basic
prediction of models of endogenous information acquisition (Maćkowiak and Wieder-
holt, 2009; Maćkowiak et al., 2018; Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003). We find a corresponding
decrease in the likelihood of choosing any of the other forecasts, but no significant
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effect on the likelihood of choosing no forecast at all.
We contribute to a research effort that aims to better understand how households
form macroeconomic expectations, and how these expectations affect their decisions
(Andre et al., 2019; Bachmann et al., 2015; Bailey et al., 2019; Coibion et al., 2020b;
D’Acunto et al., 2020; D’Acunto et al., 2019a,b; Fetzer et al., 2020; Goldfayn-Frank and
Wohlfart, 2020; Kuchler and Zafar, 2019; Qian, 2020). Our paper complements prior
work that uses observational data to study the importance of information rigidities
in macroeconomic expectation formation (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015;
Mankiw et al., 2003), and in particular the role of rational inattention (Maćkowiak
et al., 2018; Reis, 2006). Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) show that information
frictions were more severe during the period of the Great Moderation, and that the
rigidity of expectations drops during recessions. These findings are consistent with
the mechanism for which we provide micro evidence in our experiment. Moreover,
using a sample of firms, Coibion et al. (2018) provide evidence that attention to infla-
tion is correlated with proxies for incentives to acquire information.
Our paper relates to a series of recent studies that examine how information pro-
vision affects expectations about inflation (Armantier et al., 2016, 2015; Binder, 2020;
Binder and Rodrigue, 2018; Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2020a,c, 2018), house
prices (Armona et al., 2019; Fuster et al., 2020), GDP growth (Roth and Wohlfart, 2020),
or stock returns (Hanspal et al., 2020). These papers demonstrate that when individ-
uals are exposed to information, the dispersion in expectations decreases, consistent
with models of costly information acquisition. Fuster et al. (2020) provide important
evidence that people’s willingness to pay for information about house prices increases
when prediction incentives about future house price changes increase. We provide the
first direct causal evidence that perceptions of exposure to macroeconomic risk affect
the demand for information about different macroeconomic variables. A unique as-
pect of our design is that we experimentally change the real world benefits of acquir-
ing information, in the context of a risk that should matter for the real world decisions
of individuals. This should increase the empirical validity of our test (Maćkowiak et
al., 2018). Ciani et al. (2019) use observational data to show that information acquisi-
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tion costs matter for information search in the context of pension reform expectations,
complementary to our evidence on the role of expected benefits.
2 Experimental design and data
2.1 Survey administration
We collected data in September 2019 in collaboration with the widely used online
panel provider Luc.id (Haaland et al., 2020). Respondents were recruited through
generic invitation forms sent out by email. In the following, we outline the experi-
mental design. The full instructions can be found in appendix section E.
2.2 Design
Prior beliefs about group-level exposure to recessions We start by eliciting
some background characteristics of our respondents. We then ask them to think about
the effect of the Great Recession in 2008-9 in the US on people with similar characteris-
tics as them, namely people who before the recession had the same occupation, educa-
tion, age, gender and census division of residence as they have now.1 Next, we inform
all participants what the unemployment rate among people similar to them was in the
year 2007, just before the recession. The purpose of this information is to provide re-
spondents with an anchor on unemployment rates that illustrates the relevant scale
and allows respondents to meaningfully express their prior beliefs (Ansolabehere et
al., 2013). Moreover, this ensures that our information treatment does not shift be-
liefs about the baseline unemployment rate before the recession. This anchor is based
on either the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey
(CPS) on a random basis, i.e. respondents are, already at this point, prior to the actual
information treatment, assigned to one of two randomized (treatment) groups. Sub-
sequently, we elicit the respondents’ prior estimate of the unemployment rate among
1We use relatively narrowly defined cells, specifically occupation groups based on 3-digit Census 2000
occupational classifications; educational attainment of below highschool, highschool, and college; 5-year
age brackets; and Census divisions of residence.
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people similar to them in 2010, after the Great Recession, when the unemployment
rate peaked. Thereafter, we measure their self-reported confidence in this estimate on
a qualitative scale. While data on the group-level increase in unemployment in prin-
ciple can be obtained online from the ACS or the CPS, this is quite costly and time-
consuming as the data need to be found, downloaded and processed. Respondents’
reported priors should therefore not be confounded by spontaneous online searches.
Information treatment Next, we provide all respondents with truthful informa-
tion about the unemployment rate among people with similar characteristics as them
in 2010, after the Great Recession. We illustrate this information by means of a bar
chart, in which we display i) the pre-recession unemployment rate in the respon-
dent’s demographic group which had been provided as an anchor, ii) the respon-
dent’s prior estimate of the unemployment rate in her demographic group after the
Great Recession, and iii) the actual unemployment rate after the Great Recession in
this demographic group (see Figures A.1 and A.2 for an illustration). Those respon-
dents who were randomly assigned to receive the 2007 anchor based on the ACS dur-
ing the prior belief elicitation now receive the information treatment based on the
ACS, and similarly for those exposed to the CPS.2 Sampling variation and procedu-
ral differences across these two randomly assigned data sources allow us to provide
similar individuals with differential information on group-level recession exposure in
a non-deceptive way. This ultimately aims to induce exogenous treatment variation
in respondents’ perceived exposure to macroeconomic risk. We define exposure to
macroeconomic risk as the change in the group-level unemployment rate from 2007 to
2010. As explained in section 3.2, in our regressions we control for the 2007 anchor to
account for the fact that respondents exposed to different information have also seen
different anchors.
To illustrate the variation between the two data sources, consider the following hy-
pothetical participant in our experiment: a male, without a High School degree, from
2Both the ACS and the CPS are official Census surveys. While the ACS has a somewhat higher number
of respondents, the CPS is used to calculate unemployment statistics as issued by the BLS. Thus, neither
ACS nor CPS dominates the other survey.
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census division Mountain, aged between 18 and 24, with the occupation “Vehicle and
Mobile Equipment Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers”. Out of 1,000 ACS respon-
dents with those characteristics, 58 were unemployed in 2007, while 240 were unem-
ployed in 2010, after the recession. In the CPS, by contrast, 61 out of 1,000 respondents
with those characteristics were unemployed in 2007, while 322 were unemployed in
2010. Thus, while the group-level unemployment rate increased by 18.2 percentage
points according to ACS data, it increased by 26.1 percentage points according to CPS
data. Figures A.1 and A.2 display the information screens for the two treatment arms
for this example. In online appendix A, we provide more details on the variation in
the signal respondents receive.
Posterior beliefs about own exposure to recessions After the information treat-
ment, we measure participants’ perceptions of their own risk exposure using both
qualitative and quantitative questions. First, we ask our respondents to imagine that
they still work in their current job just before the next recession occurs in the US,
and to assess the probability (in percent) that they would become involuntarily un-
employed during that recession. Second, we elicit the respondents’ agreement on
5-point scales with the following three statements: (i) A recession would adversely
affect my job security; (ii) A recession would adversely affect the financial situation of
my household; (iii) My job situation depends on the macroeconomic environment.
Demand for forecasts Our main outcome of interest is respondents’ demand for
a recession forecast. We first inform all participants that the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) is a quarterly expert survey on macroeconomic forecasts for the US
economy issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We also tell them that
experts participating in the survey forecast the change in total federal government
spending, the annual rate on 10-year government bonds, and the rate of inflation over
the next 12 months, as well as the probability of a decline in real GDP in the first quar-
ter of 2020 compared to the fourth quarter of 2019. Throughout, we add explanations
to make these concepts easier to understand. For instance, we tell our respondents
that inflation refers to the change in the general price level. The respondents can then
6
choose between five options, namely receiving the average expert forecast from the
most recent wave of the SPF for any of these four variables, or receiving no informa-
tion. Subsequently, our respondents see the forecast they chose to receive. Finally, we
elicit respondents’ perceived risk of becoming unemployed over the next 12 months,
as well as their intended savings and job search behavior.
Discussion of the experimental design Our main challenge for identification
is that (perceived) exposure to macroeconomic risk is potentially endogenous to indi-
vidual characteristics. For instance, more exposed individuals may be better informed
to begin with, which may crowd out their demand for new information. Alternatively,
more exposed individuals may have higher information processing costs and there-
fore be less likely to acquire relevant information. In our design, respondents are ran-
domly assigned to receive information from the ACS or the CPS, which varies because
of sampling variation and procedural differences. As explained in detail in section 3.2,
our identification strategy generates exogenous variation in perceived risk exposure
in a non-deceptive way by exploiting the component of the provided information that
is due to the difference in this noise across the two signals.
Our identification strategy based on an active control group has several advan-
tages compared to an alternative design that provides a random subset of respondents
with information and another subset (a passive control group) with no information
(Haaland et al., 2020). First, receiving information about risk exposure may not only
shift the level of individuals’ beliefs but may also have side-effects, such as reduc-
ing their uncertainty about their risk exposure or making recessions and job loss risk
more salient. This is particularly relevant in our setting, since our main outcome is our
respondents’ demand for information. For instance, being primed on exposure to un-
employment risk during recessions could increase the demand for the recession fore-
cast. Such side-effects should arguably be similar across respondents (who all receive
information) in our design. Second, identification in the alternative design hinges on
the respondent’s prior belief, which determines the expected direction and strength
of the information treatment. Prior beliefs, however, are likely correlated with other
characteristics that, in turn, determine individuals’ demand for information and its
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elasticity to perceived risk exposure. Moreover, prior beliefs may be measured with
error, which could attenuate estimated treatment effects. In our design, the identify-
ing variation is orthogonal to priors.
Previous evidence highlights that large fractions of the population tend to be unin-
formed about recession forecasts, and revise their beliefs about job loss risk and their
consumption plans when provided with such forecasts (Roth and Wohlfart, 2020).
Participants in our survey are offered direct and easy access to a recession forecast
immediately after an exogenous change in their perceived recession exposure, and
it would likely take respondents much more time to look up this information them-
selves. These points suggest i) that respondents will likely perceive the recession fore-
cast as valuable, and ii) that our setup should be immune to crowd-out of the demand
for the recession forecast through information acquisition outside the survey.
Our measure of information acquisition captures changes in behavior along two
margins. First, respondents can decide between i) receiving a forecast and ii) not re-
ceiving a forecast and thereby more quickly completing the survey (which is required
for receiving payment). Second, respondents can choose between forecasts on four
different macroeconomic variables – government spending, interest rates, inflation
and the likelihood of a recession. We believe that these features capture in a stylized
way basic aspects of prominent macroeconomic models of endogenous information
acquisition, such as models of rational inattention. Specifically, agents in such models
optimally choose how much attention to pay overall, e.g. how much time to spend
on collecting information (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009, 2015), but also how to
allocate attention across different signals (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). An in-
crease in a respondent’s perceived exposure to recessions should increase his or her
expected benefits of receiving the recession forecast, and thereby make the participant
more willing to pay the opportunity cost of receiving the recession forecast, which
consists primarily of not receiving the forecasts on other variables and also the small
time cost.3
3Our measure of information demand is low cost in nature and therefore resembles the low cost nature of
most online news consumption. Future work could explore news consumption with higher costs involved,
for example, by eliciting willingness to pay.
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2.3 Data
Table 1 shows summary statistics of our sample as well as benchmarks from the 2017
American Community Survey. Our sample consists of 1,008 full-time employees and
is roughly representative of the corresponding part of the US population in terms of
gender, age, region, education and total household income. Our sample also resem-
bles the population along non-targeted dimensions such as occupation and industry
of employment, hours worked and log of personal labor earnings. Table 1 also shows
that respondents randomly assigned to receive information from the ACS or the CPS
are very similar in terms of a large set of observables.
3 Beliefs about exposure
3.1 Prior beliefs about risk exposure
Levels of prior beliefs Figure A.3 highlights that there is substantial variation in
respondents’ prior beliefs about the change in the unemployment rate in their demo-
graphic group over the Great Recession. On average, respondents believe that the un-
employment rate among people with similar characteristics as themselves increased
by 11 percentage points during the last recession. 25 percent of respondents believe
that the unemployment rate among individuals similar to themselves did not increase
over the Great Recession. As shown in Table A1, columns 1-2, those who were person-
ally unemployed during the Great Recession perceive a significantly higher exposure
of their demographic groups. Age, income, education, gender, job tenure and news
consumption are not significantly correlated with priors.
How closely aligned are respondents’ beliefs about their group’s exposure to the
Great Recession with reality? Figure A.4 displays binned scatter plots of respondents’
prior beliefs against the actual change in the unemployment rate in their demographic
group based on the source of information they were assigned to (the ACS or the
CPS), and on which the provided anchor of the pre-recession unemployment rate was
based. Individuals who are more exposed according to our objective group-level mea-
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sure estimate significantly stronger increases in their group-level unemployment rate.
At the median, respondents perceive a similar increase in their group-level unem-
ployment rate (3 percentage points) as indicated by the data from the ACS or CPS
they were subsequently provided with (3.4 percentage points).4,5
Despite these similarities between respondents’ beliefs and the objective bench-
marks, Figure A.4 also illustrates a lot of unexplained variation in respondents’ be-
liefs about their group’s exposure. Given the importance of sampling variation in the
ACS and CPS estimates of unemployment rates in high-dimensional demographic
cells, these patterns likely understate how well respondents’ beliefs are aligned with
reality. That said, the described patterns suggest i) that overall respondents’ beliefs
seem to be directionally aligned with reality; and ii) that respondents are not perfectly
informed about their group’s exposure to macroeconomic risk, leaving room for our
information treatment to change these beliefs.
Confidence in prior beliefs 66 percent of respondents indicate that they are at
least somewhat unsure about their group’s exposure to the Great Recession, consistent
with frictions in households’ knowledge of their own group’s exposure to macroeco-
nomic risk. Men, those who follow news about the economy, those who became un-
employed during the Great Recession, and those with a college degree exhibit higher
confidence in their beliefs about exposure to macroeconomic risk (Table A1, columns
5-8).
3.2 Updating of beliefs about exposure
Specification We next establish that our respondents’ perceived exposure to macroe-
conomic risk is shifted through the randomly assigned information treatment. To do
4Perceiving no increase in the group-level unemployment rate is associated with a 5.3 percentage points
higher likelihood of no increase according to the shown objective benchmark (p=0.115). 23.3 percent of
respondents belong to groups that experienced no increase in unemployment over the Great Recession
according to the objective signal based on ACS or CPS they subsequently received, in line with previous
evidence (Farber, 2015; Hoynes et al., 2012). This is comparable to the fraction of respondents perceiving
no increase (25 percent).
5Table A1, columns 3-4 display correlates of absolute deviations from the benchmarks. Those who be-
came unemployed during the Great Recession exhibit larger absolute deviations.
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so, we estimate the following empirical specification:
Perceived exposurei = α0 + α1∆Unemp_incr + α2Unemp_incr
alt (1)
+α3∆Unemp_2007 + α4Unemp_2007alt + ΠTXi + ε i
where Perceived exposurei is a quantitative or qualitative measure of the respondent’s
posterior belief about his or her exposure to macroeconomic risk. ∆Unemp_incr is the
difference between the information shown to the respondent, Unemp_incrshown, and
the alternative information that was not shown, Unemp_incralt.
Our identification strategy relies on the following argument: Both the signal shown
to the respondent and the alternative signal are noisy proxies for the unknown true
exposure of the respondent’s demographic group to the Great Recession:
Unemp_incrshown = Unemp_incrtrue + noiseshown
Unemp_incralt = Unemp_incrtrue + noisealt
When taking the difference between the two signals, the unknown true increase in un-
employment, Unemp_incrtrue, cancels out. Thus, this difference will purely reflect the
difference in noise between the two signals due to sampling variation and procedural
differences between ACS and CPS:
∆Unemp_incr = Unemp_incrtrue + noiseshown
− Unemp_incrtrue − noisealt
= noiseshown − noisealt
Including both Unemp_incralt and ∆Unemp_incr in our regressions is equivalent to
splitting the displayed information, Unemp_incrshown, into a potentially endogenous
and an exogenous component. The coefficient estimate of α2 on the alternative, non-
shown signal Unemp_incralt captures the effect of information on a higher group-level
exposure to the Great Recession to the extent it is driven by true exposure and the
noise in the alternative signal. This coefficient cannot be given a causal interpretation
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because it could capture i) effects of the displayed information, ii) effects of actual ex-
posure not working through the displayed information, or iii) effects of omitted vari-
ables that are correlated with actual exposure. By contrast, the coefficient α1 captures
the effect of information about a higher increase in group-level unemployment to the
extent it is driven by the difference in noise between the two signals. This difference in
noise should only matter for respondents’ posterior beliefs because the information
was shown to them. It should be orthogonal to respondents’ true risk exposure and to
omitted variables, as such variables should not vary differentially with the noise in the
shown signal and the noise in the alternative signal. Since the shown and the alterna-
tive signal are both equally likely to be based on the ACS or on the CPS, they have the
same statistical properties.6 Thus, the coefficient α1 captures exogenous variation in
provided information about group-level unemployment changes over the Great Re-
cession, and can be given a causal interpretation. Throughout the main analysis, we
focus on the coefficient estimates of α1, which are based on the exogenous component
of the information.
We similarly split the pre-recession group-level unemployment rate, which was
provided as an anchor to facilitate the elicitation of prior beliefs, into an exogenous
part, ∆Unemp_2007, and a potentially endogenous part, Unemp_2007alt. These vari-
ables should capture permanent differences in unemployment risk across groups and
any potential effect of the anchor itself. Finally, to increase statistical power, we also
control for the vector Xi, which includes fixed effects for age group, occupation, gen-
der, education, and census region. We report robust standard errors throughout the
analysis.
First-stage treatment effects Does the information change our respondents’ per-
ceived risk exposure? As reported in Table 2, Panel A, column 1, information on a
one percentage point higher increase in the unemployment rate among people with
similar characteristics during the last recession (driven by the difference in noise be-
tween shown and alternative signal) significantly increases respondents’ perceived
6Figure A.5 shows that the distributions of the two signals are indeed very similar in our sample, and
that the difference between them has a mean close to zero.
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probability of job loss during the next recession by 0.49 percentage points. Figure 1
Panel A illustrates this estimate in a binned scatter plot.7,8 Thus, respondents perceive
data on changes in unemployment rates among similar people during the last reces-
sion as relevant for their own personal future exposure to unemployment risk during
recessions. We also confirm our findings using qualitative survey measures of risk ex-
posure (Table 2, Panel A, columns 2-5). People who received information indicating
a stronger increase in unemployment are more likely to agree that recessions affect
their job security and that they are exposed to macroeconomic risk.9 In Appendix
B.1, we discuss the coefficient estimates on the other included variables, such as the
alternative signal.
How does updating about personal future risk exposure vary with confidence in
prior beliefs about changes in the group-level unemployment rate during the last re-
cession? Table 3 separately estimates the first stage equation 1 among subsamples
of respondents who were “very unsure”, “unsure” or “somewhat unsure” (Panel A)
and who were “very sure” or “sure” (Panel B) about their prior beliefs. Updating of
beliefs about personal risk exposure is fully driven by those individuals who were at
least somewhat unsure about their prior beliefs, and the effect of the provided infor-
mation differs significantly across these two groups (p<0.1).
Taken together, our first main result can be summarized as follows:
Result 1. The information provision strongly shifts our respondents’ perceived unemploy-
ment risk during future recessions. This suggests that there exist frictions in households’
knowledge of their own exposure to macroeconomic risk. Changes in beliefs about recession
exposure are fully driven by respondents with less confidence in their prior beliefs.
7About one in six workers lost a job during the Great Recession 2008-9 (Farber, 2015). Expected job loss
risk during the next recession among our respondents is somewhat higher with a median of 25 percent and
a mean of 33 percent, reflecting the skewed distribution of these beliefs (see Figure A.6).
8Our estimated learning rate is of comparable size as learning rates in experiments that study how
individuals update their expectations about macroeconomic variables in response to the provision of expert
forecasts or data on past realizations (Armona et al., 2019; Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2020c; Roth
and Wohlfart, 2020).
9The corresponding treatment effect on perceptions of whether recessions affect the financial situation
of the respondent’s household is smaller in size and statistically insignificant, potentially due to insurance
within the household.
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4 Perceived risk exposure and demand for informa-
tion
4.1 Descriptive evidence on demand for macroeconomic in-
formation
There is substantial variation in the demand for different forecasts, even though all
respondents were primed on how recessions affect the unemployment rate of their
group. While about 25 percent choose to receive the forecast about the likelihood of a
recession, an equally large share select the inflation forecast. 17 percent of respondents
decide to receive the government spending forecast, and 15 percent choose the interest
rate forecast. 18 percent of respondents prefer not to receive any forecast, potentially
because they would like to complete the survey more quickly.
Table A2 sheds light on the demographic correlates of the demand for different
macroeconomic forecasts. For instance, men are 7.6 percentage points more likely to
acquire the recession forecast, in line with their higher exposure to macroeconomic
risk (Hoynes et al., 2012). Similarly, those who experienced a phase of unemployment
during the Great Recession are around 8 percentage points (p<0.1) more likely to select
the recession forecast. Moreover, those with a college degree and those who regularly
follow news on the economy are around 8 and 6 percentage points (p<0.01) more
likely to pick the recession forecast, respectively.
4.2 Main evidence
Reduced form estimates We estimate the reduced form effect of our information
treatment on the respondents’ demand for the recession forecast using the following
specification:
Demand for infoi = β0 + β1∆Unemp_incr + β2Unemp_incralt (2)
+β3∆Unemp_2007 + β4Unemp_2007alt + ΦTXi + ε i
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Demand for infoi stands for a set of dummy variables representing the different pieces
of information respondents can choose from. The main dummy outcome of interest,
RecessionForecasti takes the value one if the respondent chooses to receive the pro-
fessional forecast on the likelihood of a recession and zero otherwise. We include the
same set of control variables as in the first stage specification 1. We again focus on
our estimate of β1, which captures the effect of the exogenous component of the infor-
mation driven by the difference in noise between the two signals, and discuss other
coefficient estimates in Appendix B.1.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that respondents who learn about a one percentage point
higher exposure to unemployment risk among people similar to themselves are 0.6
percentage points more likely to choose the recession forecast (p < 0.01, column 1),
while their demand for the interest rate forecast is lower (p < 0.05, column 3). We
find small and noisily measured effects on the likelihood of choosing the government
spending forecast (column 2) or the inflation forecast (column 4). Overall, our average
estimated treatment effect is driven by how agents allocate attention across different
signals (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) (column 5) and less by how much atten-
tion agents pay overall, i.e. whether they choose any piece of information or none
(Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015) (column 6). Figure 1, Panels B-D illustrate our
reduced form evidence as binned scatter plots.
Instrumental variables estimates For a more intuitive interpretation of magni-
tudes, we estimate a two stage least squares model. Specifically, we instrument re-
spondents’ posterior belief about their own unemployment risk during the next re-
cession by the exogenous component of the provided information on group-level un-
employment risk during the last recession, which is due to the difference in noise
between shown and alternative signal:
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Demand for infoi = γ0 + γ1 ̂Perceived exposurei + γ2Unemp_incr
alt
+ γ3∆Unemp_2007 + γ4Unemp_2007alt + ΩTXi + ε i
̂Perceived exposurei = α̂0 + α̂1∆Unemp_incr + α̂2Unemp_incr
alt
+ α̂3∆Unemp_2007 + α̂4Unemp_2007alt + Π̂TXi (3)
This specification allows us to quantify the causal effect of perceived personal unem-
ployment risk during the next recession on the probability of demanding the profes-
sional forecast about the likelihood of a recession.
Panel C of Table 2 shows that a one percentage point increase in the perceived like-
lihood of personal job loss during the next recession increases respondents’ demand
for the recession forecast by 1.2 percentage points (column 1, p < 0.05). The demand
for receiving any of the other forecasts (column 5) or no forecast (column 6) decreases
accordingly, but these effects are noisily measured in the IV setup.
What is the economic magnitude of our findings? Relative to the average proba-
bility of choosing the recession forecast of 25 percent, the increase by 1.2 percentage
points in response to a one percentage point higher perceived exposure corresponds
to an increase in information demand by 5 percent. For comparison, having been un-
employed during the Great Recession increases information demand by as much as an
increase in the perceived risk of becoming unemployed during the next recession by
6 percentage points. Similarly, a 5 percentage points higher unemployment risk has
an effect that is comparable to the difference in information demand between those
who generally follow news about the economy and those who do not. Thus, the ex-
pected benefit of acquiring the forecast has a substantial causal effect on respondents’
demand for it.
Taken together, our second main result can be summarized as follows:
Result 2. People’s demand for receiving a forecast about the likelihood of a recession causally
increases in their perceived exposure to unemployment risk during recessions, consistent with
a basic prediction of macroeconomic models of endogenous information acquisition.
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In Appendix B.2 we demonstrate that our findings are robust to varying the set of
controls, and that experimenter demand effects and numerical anchoring are unlikely
to be a concern.
4.3 Treatment effect heterogeneity
We also examine heterogeneity in the treatment effects, starting with the role of con-
fidence in prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession. In Table
3, Panels C and D we estimate the reduced-form equation 2 on subsamples of indi-
viduals who were more or less confident in their prior beliefs. Receiving information
on a higher group-level exposure to the Great Recession significantly increases the
demand for the recession forecast, but only significantly so among those who are less
confident in their prior. Given that the information treatment changes perceived job
loss risk during the next recession only among less confident respondents (see Panel
A), this finding suggests that treatment effects on information demand indeed work
through changes in perceived exposure to future recessions. In Panel E we report es-
timates of the IV specification 3 on the subsample of less confident individuals, which
confirms a strong causal effect of perceived recession exposure on demand for the
recession forecast in this subsample (p<0.05). In Appendix B.3 we discuss heteroge-
neous treatment effects across different demographic groups.
5 Other outcomes
To validate the relevance of our measure of perceived macroeconomic risk exposure,
we examine the causal effect of perceived risk exposure on personal unemployment
expectations, planned savings behavior and intended job search. Panel A of Table
A3 shows reduced form evidence. In this section, we focus on Panel B, where we
report results from our 2SLS specification (equation 3). A one percentage point higher
perceived probability of becoming unemployed during the next recession causes an
increase in respondents’ perceived likelihood of becoming unemployed over the next
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12 months by 0.47 percentage points (column 1).10 Similarly, it increases respondents’
likelihood of looking for a new job in a different occupation (column 4) or in another
industry (column 5) over the next 12 months by 0.53 percentage points and by 0.44
percentage points, respectively.11 These effects could be driven by a desire to move to
a job with lower exposure to macroeconomic risk.
In contrast, respondents’ perceived exposure to recessions does not significantly
affect their planned precautionary saving (columns 2 and 3). This could be due to a
large fraction of respondents exhibiting hand-to-mouth consumption behavior (Ka-
plan and Violante, 2014). Indeed, 42 percent of our respondents report that they did
not engage in precautionary saving over the four weeks before the survey. Alterna-
tively, the lack of significant effects may reflect low statistical power. Taken together,
perceived exposure to unemployment risk during recessions affects some relevant
economic expectations and intended behaviors in expected directions.
6 Conclusion and implications
Our findings have implications for the modeling of information frictions in macroe-
conomics. First, our main finding that perceived risk exposure increases demand for
the recession forecast suggests that information acquisition depends on its expected
benefits – a basic prediction of macroeconomic models of endogenous information
acquisition, such as models of rational inattention (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009;
Maćkowiak et al., 2018; Sims, 2003), sparsity (Gabaix, 2019) or sticky information with
endogenous updating frequency (Reis, 2006).
Second, our first stage evidence that households’ beliefs about their own risk ex-
posure strongly respond to information suggests that there are important frictions in
the context of individuals’ knowledge about their exposure to business cycle fluctu-
10In combination with the treatment effect on perceived unemployment risk during the next recession
(see Table 2) this implies a perceived probability of a recession in the coming 12 months of close to 50
percent, higher than the expert forecast of 18 percent. This is consistent with greater pessimism about the
macroeconomy among households than among experts (Das et al., 2020; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020).
11Respondents receiving different information about exposure have different probabilities of choosing
each forecast. However, our findings on other outcomes remain very similar if we control for the (endoge-
nous) choice of information.
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ations. Such frictions could distort households’ beliefs about the expected benefits
of acquiring macroeconomic information. Exploring the consequences of frictions in
households’ knowledge of their own risk exposure in quantitative macroeconomic
models could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Notes: This figure shows binned scatter plots of the first-stage specification (equation 1) measuring the ef-
fect of the treatment information on perceived recession exposure (Panel A) as well as the reduced form
specification (equation 2) measuring the effect of the treatment information on demand for macroeconomic
forecasts (Panels B-D). The outcomes are “Belief: Exposure to Recession” – the respondent’s perceived per-
cent chance of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same job as now (Panel A)
– as well as dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose the recession forecast (Panel B), if
the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (Panel C), or if the respondent chose no forecast
(Panel D). “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level
unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change according to
the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information.
The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative
source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline
unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according
to the alternative source. All plots additionally partial out a polynomial in age, a dummy for college edu-
cation, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well as a
dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession.
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Main tables
Table 1: Summary-Balance Table
ACS Online Sample




















Female 0.46 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.998
Age 41.73 40.25 37.00 11.38 40.48 40.02 0.513
At least Bachelor’s degree 0.36 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.921
Log(Household Income) 11.22 11.00 11.04 1.16 10.99 11.00 0.249
Northeast 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.18 0.16 0.502
Midwest 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.23 0.25 0.629
South 0.37 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.41 0.41 0.825
West 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.18 0.19 0.688
Management, Business and Financial Occupations 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.25 0.26 0.745
Professional and Related Occupations 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.21 0.23 0.612
Service Occupations 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.15 0.13 0.534
Sales and Office Occupations 0.22 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.25 0.25 0.744
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance Occupations 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.07 0.08 0.591
Production, Transportation, and Material Moving Occupations 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.07 0.06 0.485
Other Occupation 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.320
Industry: Construction and Manufacturing 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.17 0.16 0.807
Industry: Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.14 0.11 0.093
Industry: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.13 0.11 0.267
Industry: Professional Services 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.36 0.16 0.16 0.836
Industry: Education and Health Care 0.24 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.12 0.14 0.217
Industry: Leisure and Hospitality and Other Services 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.19 0.21 0.384
Other Industry 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.10 0.11 0.591
Log(Personal Labor Earnings) 10.60 10.59 10.65 0.74 10.60 10.59 0.787
Hours Worked 42.38 40.98 45.00 7.05 40.77 41.19 0.339
Tenure at Main Job (Years) 7.95 7.50 7.20 7.76 8.14 0.403
Unemployed during Great Recession 2007-9 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.18 0.14 0.170
Prior Belief Unempl. Incr. 11.00 3.00 16.27 10.78 11.23 0.660
High Confidence in Prior Belief 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.28 0.29 0.873
Unempl. Incr.shown 4.36 3.40 7.62 3.71 5.00
Unempl. 2007shown 4.05 2.80 4.17 4.25 3.86
Unempl. Incr.alt 3.87 3.20 7.55 4.23 3.51
Unempl. 2007alt 4.21 3.00 4.26 3.90 4.51
Observations 1008 1008 1008 501 507
Notes: This table displays summary statistics of our full sample (columns 2-4), benchmarks for key demo-
graphics from the ACS (column 1) and a balance check between the two treatment arms who have received
information calculated from the ACS or from the CPS (columns 5-7). “Unempl. Incr. Shown” indicates
the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate that was provided to the respondent, and
“Unempl. Incr. Alt” indicates the change in the group-level unemployment rate as calculated from the
alternative source that was not shown to the respondent. “Unempl. 2007 Shown” and “Unempl. 2007
Alt” denote the 2007 baseline group-level unemployment rate that was provided as an anchor and from the
alternative source, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: First Stage
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.489∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.007 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008
R2 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07
Mean outcome 32.98 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: Reduced Form
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 -0.004∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008
R2 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06
Panel C: IV
Belief: Exposure to recession 0.012∗∗ -0.004 -0.006∗ 0.002 -0.008 -0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008
First stage F-stat 13.28 13.28 13.28 13.28 13.28 13.28
Mean outcome 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.57 0.18
St. dev. outcome 0.43 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.39
Notes: This table shows estimates of the first-stage specification (equation 1) measuring the effect of the
treatment information on perceived recession exposure (Panel A), as well as the reduced form specifica-
tion (equation 2, Panel B) and the IV specification (equation 3, Panel C) measuring the effect of perceived
recession exposure on demand for macroeconomic forecasts. The outcome in Panel A column 1, “Belief:
Exposure to Recession”, denotes the respondent’s perceived percent chance of job loss during the next
recession conditional on working in the same job as now. The outcomes in Panel A columns 2-4 are respon-
dents’ agreement on categorical scales to verbal statements describing their exposure to macroeconomic
risk, and are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the sample. The outcome in Panel A
column 5 is the z-scored unweighted average of the outcomes from columns 1-4 (also standardizing the
outcome from column 1). The outcomes in Panel A columns 2-5 are z-scored using the mean and the stan-
dard deviation in the sample. The outcomes in Panels B and C are dummy variables taking value one if
the respondent chose a particular forecast (columns 1-4), if the respondent chose any other (non-recession)
forecast (column 5), or if the respondent chose no forecast (column 6). “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the dif-
ference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the information
shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e.
the exogenous component of the provided information. The specifications also control for the increase in
the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component
of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown
source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. All specifications
additionally control for a polynomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for census region of
residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in
prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Low confidence
∆ Unempl. Incr. (a) 0.642∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722
Panel B: High confidence
∆ Unempl. Incr. (b) 0.149 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
(0.238) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C: Low confidence
∆ Unempl. Incr. (c) 0.007∗∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.004∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722
Panel D: High confidence
∆ Unempl. Incr. (d) 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.009∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286
p-value (c=d) 0.462 0.642 0.443 0.270 0.261 0.096
Panel E: Low confidence (IV)
Belief: Exposure to recession 0.011∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.007∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722
First stage F-stat 12.63 12.63 12.63 12.63 12.63 12.63
Notes: This table shows estimates of the first-stage specification (equation 1, Panels A and B), the reduced
form specification (equation 2, Panels C and D) and the IV specification (equation 3, Panel E), separately
on subsamples of respondents who are at least somewhat unsure (Panels A, C, E) and respondents who
are sure or very sure (Panels B and D) about their prior beliefs about their group’s exposure to the Great
Recession. The outcome in Panels A and B column 1, “Belief: Exposure to Recession”, denotes the respon-
dent’s perceived percent chance of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same
job as now. The outcomes in Panels A and B columns 2-4 are respondents’ agreement on categorical scales
to verbal statements describing their exposure to macroeconomic risk, and are z-scored using the mean
and the standard deviation in the sample. The outcome in Panels A and B column 5 is the z-scored un-
weighted average of the outcomes from columns 1-4 (also standardizing the outcome from column 1). The
outcomes in Panels C-E are dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose a particular forecast
(columns 1-4), if the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (column 5), or if the respondent
chose no forecast (column 6). “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in
the group-level unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change
according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided
information. The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from
the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference
in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline
rate according to the alternative source. All specifications additionally control for a polynomial in age, a
dummy for college education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation
classification, as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Online Appendix: Risk Exposure and Attention to the
Macroeconomy
Christopher Roth Sonja Settele Johannes Wohlfart
Summary of the online appendix
Section A provides details on the variation between group-level unemployment rates
based on the ACS or the CPS, which we exploit for our information treatment. In
Section B we discuss additional results. Sections C and D provide additional figures
and tables, respectively. Section E presents the experimental instructions.
A Details on treatment variation
The respondents in our experiment are randomly assigned to receive information on
the actual change in the unemployment rate in their demographic group between
2007 and 2010 calculated either based on data from the American Community Survey
(ACS) or from the Current Population Survey (CPS). This appendix section provides
details on the variation in the information calculated from ACS or CPS.
When calculating group-level unemployment rates in 2007 and in 2010 from the
ACS and the CPS, we start with the full samples of individuals that are at least 18
years old, are either full-time employed, part-time employed or unemployed (drop-
ping those out of the labor force), and do not work in the armed forces. We de-
fine demographic cells based on three groups of highest educational attainment (be-
low highschool, highschool degree, college degree), ten age groups based on age in
2007 (18-24, 25-39, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65 and older), gen-
der (male, female), nine census divisions (New England, Middle Atlantic, South At-
lantic, East South Central, West South Central, East North Central, West North Cen-
tral, Mountain, Pacific) and 92 3-digit occupation groups based on the 2000 Census
occupation definition (see https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/coding/pdfs/2000_
Census_Occupation.pdf for an overview). The occupation is based on the job that an
1
individual earns most money from, and unemployed individuals indicate the occu-
pation they had in their most recent job.
We next drop all demographic cells with less than 10 individuals in order to still
have a meaningful number of respondents to calculate group-level unemployment
rates. In the case of the ACS, this removes 37,012 out of 75,508 groups, but the remain-
ing sample still accounts for 95.4 percent of the population (for the CPS this removes
28,021 out of 59,212 groups and leaves us with a sample that accounts for 93 percent of
the population). Subsequently, we drop from both datasets demographic cells which
are either missing in the ACS or in the CPS in the year 2007 or in the year 2010. The
remaining dataset still accounts for about 86 percent of the population. In the begin-
ning of our survey we screen out potential respondents that belong to demographic
groups which are missing in the Census data after this procedure. This enables us to
use the same level of granularity to calculate group-level changes in unemployment
rates for all participants in the actual experiment.
Weighted by the numbers of individuals in the ACS data of the relevant year in
the different demographic groups, the ACS gives slightly higher average unemploy-
ment rates than the CPS (3.57 percent vs 2.39 percent in 2007 and 7.27 percent vs 6.16
percent in 2010). Our numbers are somewhat smaller than the official BLS numbers
(4.6 percent in 2007 and 9.6 percent in 2010) as a consequence of dropping smaller de-
mographic cells, which faced higher unemployment rates. Figure A.7 displays binned
scatter plots of group-level unemployment rates in 2007 and in 2010 calculated based
on ACS data against unemployment rates based on CPS data using a group-level
dataset containing information from both the ACS and the CPS. The figure uses the
numbers of individuals in the ACS data of the relevant year in the different demo-
graphic groups as weights. There is a strong linear relationship between group-level
unemployment rates calculated based on the ACS and rates calculated from the CPS.
The slopes are 0.4679 (standard error of 0.0147) in 2007 and 0.4251 (standard error of
0.0105) in 2010 when regressing ACS rates on CPS rates and a constant. However, the
R-squared is 0.2393 in 2007 and 0.3079 in 2010, indicating that sampling variation and
procedural differences between the surveys provide a substantial degree of variation
2
that we exploit in the information provision in our experiment.
B Additional results
B.1 Coefficient estimates on other included variables
Table A4 displays the first stage estimates of the effect of the information treatment
on perceived personal exposure to recessions. The coefficient estimates on ∆ Unempl.
Incr. capture the effect of the exogenous component of the information discussed in
the main text (Section 3.2). As explained in Section 3.2, the coefficient on the poten-
tially endogenous component of the information, Unempl. Incralt, captures i) effects
of information, ii) effects of actual risk exposure not working through the displayed
information, and iii) omitted variables that are correlated with actual risk exposure.
The exogenous and the endogenous components of the information have very similar
effects on respondents’ posterior beliefs about their own risk exposure. This implies
that effects of actual risk exposure not working through the displayed information
and effects of omitted variables are either small (conditional on the included demo-
graphic controls) or cancel each other out. In addition, the exogenous component of
the provided information on the baseline unemployment rate before the recession, ∆
Unempl. 2007, increases people’s perceived risk of becoming unemployed during the
next recession, while the potentially endogenous component, Unempl. 2007alt, has no
significant effect. One explanation for the positive effects of the anchor is that respon-
dents might infer from a higher provided baseline unemployment rate to a higher rate
of labor market turnover, including a higher job loss rate, in their group.
Table A5 displays the reduced form effects of the information treatment on the
demand for the different macroeconomic forecasts. Again, the endogenous and the
exogenous components of the provided information have similar effects: information
on a higher group-level unemployment rate increases the demand for the recession
forecast, and decreases the demand for the interest rate forecast. A higher exogenous
component of the provided anchor is also associated with a lower demand for the
interest rate forecast, but has no effect on demand for other macroeconomic forecasts.
3
The potentially endogenous component of the anchor has no effect. Throughout our
main analysis, our focus is on the perceived increase in unemployment rates during
recessions and we control for baseline unemployment rates in all main regressions.
B.2 Robustness and alternative explanations
In this section we present various robustness checks and discuss alternative explana-
tions of our findings.
B.2.1 Different sets of control variables
As explained in section 3.2, our identification strategy relies on decomposing the treat-
ment information into an exogenous and a potentially endogenous component. The
exogenous component relies on the difference in noise between the provided and the
alternative signal, and should be uncorrelated with omitted variables. To rule out any
concerns that our findings are driven by omitted variables, e.g. due to potential imbal-
ances in the treatment assignment, we demonstrate robustness to using different sets
of control variables in Tables A8 and A9. Panel A shows our baseline specifications. In
Panel B we drop all demographic control variables. In Panel C we include all baseline
controls and in addition control for respondents’ prior beliefs about their group’s ex-
posure to macroeconomic risk. In Panels D and E we control for fixed effects for more
or less fine-grained cells based on interactions of gender, age, occupation group and
education – the variables that are used to calculate the treatment information. In Panel
F we also add respondents’ household income to the construction of cells for which
we include dummies. Although our results naturally become more noisily measured
when we control for a higher share of the treatment variation through fine-grained cell
fixed effects, they remain similar in magnitude and statistically significant, indicating
that omitted variable bias is unlikely.
4
B.2.2 Experimenter demand effects
It could be possible that treatment effects are confounded by experimenter demand
effects, i.e. by respondents guessing the purpose of the study and trying to conform
with it depending on the signal they received. We believe that demand effects are
unlikely for three reasons. First, recent evidence suggests that participants in online
experiments respond only very moderately to explicit signals of experimenter expec-
tations (de Quidt et al., 2018). Second, our use of an active control group design, where
every participant is exposed to information, makes differences across respondents re-
ceiving different information very subtle. Third, virtually no respondent guessed the
actual purpose of our study when asked in a mandatory open text entry question at
the end of the survey.
B.2.3 Numerical anchoring
Our estimates of the effects of information on people’s perceived probability of be-
coming unemployed during the next recession could, in principle, be affected by un-
conscious numerical anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). We think that this is
unlikely for two reasons: First, we deliberately used a different scale for the quantita-
tive post-treatment beliefs as compared to the information treatment (percent chance
of becoming unemployed vs. number of unemployed out of 1,000 individuals). Sec-
ond, we find very similar patterns using qualitative measures of perceived exposure
to macroeconomic risk.
B.3 Heterogeneity across demographic groups
How do changes in perceived risk exposure in response to information vary across de-
mographic groups? Changes in perceived risk exposure are stronger for individuals
without a college degree (Panel A of Table A6) and those with lower incomes (Panel
C), although not significantly so. These patterns are consistent with individuals in
these groups being less confident in their prior beliefs. There are no major differences
in first stage effects between men and women (Panels E and F), or between younger
5
and older individuals (Panels G and H).
Which demographic subgroups are driving our main results on information de-
mand? The treatment effect on demand for the recession forecast is driven by indi-
viduals with less than a college degree, in line with a stronger first stage among these
individuals (Panel A of Table A7). Moreover, the reduced form effect is significant
only among younger individuals (Panel G). Differences according to income (Panels
C and D) or gender (Panels E and F) are less pronounced.
C Additional figures
6
Figure A.1: Example Screen of the information treatment: ACS
Notes: This figure displays an example of the information provision in the ACS treatment arm.
7
Figure A.2: Example Screen of the information treatment: CPS
Notes: This figure displays an example of the information provision in the CPS treatment arm.
8
Figure A.3: Histogram: Prior beliefs about group-level unemployment rate change be-
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Panel B: CPS info shown
Notes: This figure displays histograms of respondents’ prior beliefs about the percentage point change
in the unemployment rate among individuals with similar characteristics as themselves (in terms of age,
education, gender, occupation and census division of residence) between 2007 and 2010, for the full sample
(Panel A) and separately for those 501 respondents who received anchor and information from the ACS





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.6: Histogram: Posterior perceived probability of becoming personally unem-
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Belief: Exposure to Recession
Notes: This figure displays a histogram of respondents’ posterior beliefs about their percent chance of per-
sonally becoming involuntarily unemployed during the next recession in the US if they still work in the
same job.
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Notes: This figure displays binned scatter plots and linear fits of group-level unemployment rates calculated
based on data from the ACS against rates based on data from the CPS, as well as 45 degree reference lines.
The figures are based on group-level datasets containing information on unemployment rates from both
surveys. Scatter plots and linear fits are calculated using the numbers of respondents in the demographic
cells of the ACS as weights. The figure on the left plots unemployment rates in 2007, while the figure on the
right plots unemployment rates in 2010. In 2007, the linear fit has a slope of 0.4679 (robust standard error
of 0.0147) and an R-squared of 0.2393. In 2010, the linear fit has a slope of 0.4251 (robust standard error of
0.0105) and an R-squared of 0.3079. Groups with unemployment rates higher than 20 are dropped from the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Reduced form
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.231∗ 0.009 0.004 0.261∗∗ 0.213∗
(0.118) (0.008) (0.018) (0.129) (0.126)
Log(Past saving) 0.604∗∗∗
(0.025)
Past saving rate 0.565∗∗∗
(0.057)
Observations 1008 1008 1000 1007 1008
R2 0.09 0.50 0.55 0.11 0.10
Panel B: IV
Belief: Exposure to recession 0.472∗∗∗ 0.018 0.008 0.533∗∗ 0.435∗∗
(0.180) (0.017) (0.036) (0.236) (0.220)
Log(Past saving) 0.600∗∗∗
(0.025)
Past saving rate 0.565∗∗∗
(0.056)
Observations 1008 1008 1000 1007 1008
First stage F-stat 13.28 12.86 12.65 13.30 13.28
Mean dep. var. 20.69 3.65 3.27 27.71 28.39
SD dep. var. 23.66 2.47 4.88 29.18 29.06
Notes: This table shows estimates of the reduced form specification (equation 2, Panel A) and the IV speci-
fication (equation 3, Panel B) measuring the effect of perceived recession exposure on other outcomes. The
outcomes are the respondent’s perceived probability of becoming personally unemployed over the next 12
months (column 1), the log of the planned amount saved for precautionary reasons over the four weeks
after the survey (column 2), the ratio of the planned amount saved for precautionary reasons to household
income over the next four weeks (column 3), and perceived probabilities of looking for a new job in a dif-
ferent occupation (column 4) or different industry (column 5) over the next 12 months. “Belief: Exposure to
Recession” denotes the respondent’s perceived percent chance of job loss during the next recession condi-
tional on working in the same job as now. “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010
change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and
the change according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of
the provided information. The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as cal-
culated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as
the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source,
and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. All specifications additionally control for a poly-
nomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit
occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs about group-level
exposure to the Great Recession. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The specifications in column 2
and 3 additionally control for log household income, and the log amount saved for precautionary reasons
(column 2) and the ratio of precautionary saving to income (column 3) over the past four weeks. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.489∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.007 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Unempl. Incr.alt 0.506∗∗∗ 0.008 0.003 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.176) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
∆ Unempl. 2007 0.474∗ 0.008 0.013 0.019∗∗ 0.018∗
(0.275) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Unempl. 2007alt 0.445 -0.012 -0.003 0.004 0.002
(0.339) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008
R2 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07
Notes: This table shows estimates of the first-stage specification (equation 1) displaying coefficient estimates
on other variables. The outcome in column 1, “Belief: Exposure to Recession”, denotes the respondent’s
perceived percent chance of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same job as
now. The outcomes in columns 2-4 are respondents’ agreement on categorical scales to verbal statements
describing their exposure to macroeconomic risk, and are z-scored using the mean and the standard devi-
ation in the sample. The outcome in column 5 is the z-scored unweighted average of the outcomes from
columns 1-4 (also standardizing the outcome from column 1). The table displays coefficient estimates on:
the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the in-
formation shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative, non-shown information
source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information (“∆ Unempl. Incr.”); the increase in the
unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the
information, “Unempl. Incr.alt”); the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown
source and alternative source (“∆ Unempl. 2007”); and the baseline rate according to the alternative source
(“Unempl. 2007alt”). All specifications additionally control for a polynomial in age, a dummy for college
education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well
as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Unempl. Incr.alt 0.008∗∗ -0.003 -0.004∗ 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Unempl. 2007 0.002 0.005 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Unempl. 2007alt -0.001 0.007 -0.010∗∗ 0.006 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008
R2 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06
Notes: This table shows estimates of the reduced form specification (equation 2) displaying the coefficient
estimates on other variables. The outcomes are dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose
a particular forecast (columns 1-4), if the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (column 5),
or if the respondent chose no forecast (column 6). The table displays coefficient estimates on: the differ-
ence between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the information
shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e.
the exogenous component of the provided information (“∆ Unempl. Incr.”); the increase in the unem-
ployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the in-
formation, “Unempl. Incr.alt”); the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown
source and alternative source (“∆ Unempl. 2007”); and the baseline rate according to the alternative source
(“Unempl. 2007alt”). All specifications additionally control for a polynomial in age, a dummy for college
education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well
as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs about group-level exposure to the Great Recession.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Below college
∆ Unempl. Incr. (a) 0.574∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.007 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 579 579 579 579 579
Panel B: College
∆ Unempl. Incr. (b) 0.384∗∗ 0.011 0.005 0.012∗ 0.013
(0.195) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 429 429 429 429 429
p-value (a=b) 0.469 0.696 0.835 0.745 0.624
Panel C: Income < USD75,000
∆ Unempl. Incr. (c) 0.727∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.009 0.016∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 585 585 585 585 585
Panel D: Income ≥ USD75,000
∆ Unempl. Incr. (d) 0.244 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.010
(0.201) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 415 415 415 415 415
p-value (c=d) 0.064 0.675 0.451 0.455 0.270
Panel E: Female
∆ Unempl. Incr. (e) 0.427∗∗ 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.010
(0.193) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 497 497 497 497 497
Panel F: Male
∆ Unempl. Incr. (f) 0.560∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 511 511 511 511 511
p-value (e=f) 0.627 0.378 0.215 0.112 0.212
Panel G: Age≤37
∆ Unempl. Incr. (g) 0.491∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 527 527 527 527 527
Panel H: Age>37
∆ Unempl. Incr. (h) 0.507∗∗ 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.012
(0.231) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 481 481 481 481 481
p-value (g=h) 0.957 0.340 0.627 0.470 0.544
Notes: This table shows estimates of the first-stage specification (equation 1) separately on subsamples of
respondents without a college degree or with a college degree (Panels A-B), with low or high household
income (Panels C-D), who are female or male (Panels E-F), and who are younger or older (Panels G-H).
The outcome in column 1, “Belief: Exposure to Recession”, denotes the respondent’s perceived percent
chance of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same job as now. The outcomes
in columns 2-4 are respondents’ agreement on categorical scales to verbal statements describing their ex-
posure to macroeconomic risk, and are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the sample.
The outcome in column 5 is the z-scored unweighted average of the outcomes from columns 1-4 (also stan-
dardizing the outcome from column 1). “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010
change in the group-level unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and
the change according to the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of
the provided information. The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as cal-
culated from the alternative source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as
the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source,
and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. All specifications additionally control for a poly-
nomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit
occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Below college
∆ Unempl. Incr. (a) 0.008∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 579 579 579 579 579 579
Panel B: College
∆ Unempl. Incr. (b) 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 429 429 429 429 429 429
p-value (a=b) 0.084 0.889 0.563 0.883 0.570 0.323
Panel C: Income < USD75,000
∆ Unempl. Incr. (c) 0.005∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 585 585 585 585 585 585
Panel D: Income ≥ USD75,000
∆ Unempl. Incr. (d) 0.006 -0.002 -0.005∗∗ 0.001 -0.006∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 415 415 415 415 415 415
p-value (c=d) 0.948 0.803 0.191 0.895 0.263 0.323
Panel E: Female
∆ Unempl. Incr. (e) 0.007∗∗ -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
Panel F: Male
∆ Unempl. Incr. (f) 0.006∗ -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ 0.002 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 511 511 511 511 511 511
p-value (e=f) 0.912 0.224 0.057 0.966 0.036 0.023
Panel G: Age≤37
∆ Unempl. Incr. (g) 0.007∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.005∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 527 527 527 527 527 527
Panel H: Age>37
∆ Unempl. Incr. (h) 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 481 481 481 481 481 481
p-value (g=h) 0.477 0.830 0.555 0.822 0.481 0.976
Notes: This table shows estimates of the reduced-form specification (equation 2) separately on subsamples
of respondents without a college degree or with a college degree (Panels A-B), with low or high household
income (Panels C-D), who are female or male (Panels E-F), and who are younger or older (Panels G-H). The
outcomes are dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose a particular forecast (columns 1-4),
if the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (column 5), or if the respondent chose no forecast
(column 6). “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level
unemployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change according to
the alternative, non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information.
The specifications also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative
source (the potentially endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline
unemployment rates in 2007 between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according
to the alternative source. All specifications additionally control for a polynomial in age, a dummy for
college education, dummies for census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification,
as well as a dummy indicating high confidence in prior beliefs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Main specification
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.489∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.007 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07
Panel B: No controls
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.528∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
R2 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Panel C: A plus prior belief
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.485∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.007 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07
Panel D: sex-age-educ-occu-cells
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.461∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.006 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
R2 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.14
Cell count 55 55 55 55 55
Cell count (N ≥ 10) 33 33 33 33 33
Panel E: sex-age-educ-detailed occu-cells
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.450∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.007 0.011∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.18
Cell count 110 110 110 110 110
Cell count (N ≥ 10) 32 32 32 32 32
Panel F: sex-age-inc-occu-cells
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.494∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.007 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11
Cell count 56 56 56 56 56
Cell count (N ≥ 10) 37 37 37 37 37
Notes: This table shows estimates of the first-stage specification (equation 1) varying the set of control variables.
The outcome in column 1, “Belief: Exposure to Recession”, denotes the respondent’s perceived percent chance
of job loss during the next recession conditional on working in the same job as now. The outcomes in columns
2-4 are respondents’ agreement on categorical scales to verbal statements describing their exposure to macroeco-
nomic risk, and are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the sample. The outcome in column
5 is the z-scored unweighted average of the outcomes from columns 1-4 (also standardizing the outcome from
column 1). “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unem-
ployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative,
non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information. The specifications
also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially
endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007
between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. Panel A
includes the baseline set of controls, namely a polynomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for
census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high
confidence in prior beliefs. Panel B excludes these controls. Panel C includes the baseline controls and the re-
spondent’s prior belief about the change in the unemployment rate in her group during the Great Recession. In
addition to the baseline controls, Panels D-F include fixed effects for different sets of interactions of demographic
characteristics: Panel D includes cell fixed effects based on interactions of sex, two age groups, two education
groups, and seven occupation groups. Panel E includes cell fixed effects based on interactions of sex, two age
groups, two education groups and 22 occupation groups. Panel F includes cell fixed effects based on interactions
of sex, two age groups, two income groups and seven occupation groups. In Panels D, E and F, we report the
number of demographic cells as well as the number of cells in which we have at least 10 respondents in our
sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct.
level. 22

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Main specification
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 -0.004∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06
Panel B: No controls
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.005∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.004∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: A plus prior belief
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 -0.004∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06
Panel D: sex-age-educ-occu-cells
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.005∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.11
Cell count 55 55 55 55 55 55
Cell count (N ≥ 10) 33 33 33 33 33 33
Panel E: sex-age-educ-detailed occu-cells
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.006∗∗ -0.003 -0.003∗ 0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R2 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.16
Cell count 110 110 110 110 110 110
Cell count (N ≥ 10) 32 32 32 32 32 32
Panel F: sex-age-inc-occu-cells
∆ Unempl. Incr. 0.006∗∗ -0.002 -0.003∗ 0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.12
Cell count 56 56 56 56 56 56
Cell count (N ≥ 10) 37 37 37 37 37 37
Notes: This table shows estimates of the reduced-form specification (equation 2) varying the set of control vari-
ables. The outcomes are dummy variables taking value one if the respondent chose a particular forecast (columns
1-4), if the respondent chose any other (non-recession) forecast (column 5), or if the respondent chose no forecast
(column 6). “∆ Unempl. Incr.” indicates the difference between the 2007-2010 change in the group-level unem-
ployment rate according to the information shown to the respondent and the change according to the alternative,
non-shown information source, i.e. the exogenous component of the provided information. The specifications
also control for the increase in the unemployment rate as calculated from the alternative source (the potentially
endogenous component of the information), as well as the difference in the baseline unemployment rates in 2007
between shown source and alternative source, and the baseline rate according to the alternative source. Panel A
includes the baseline set of controls, namely a polynomial in age, a dummy for college education, dummies for
census region of residence, dummies for 1-digit occupation classification, as well as a dummy indicating high
confidence in prior beliefs. Panel B excludes these controls. Panel C includes the baseline controls and the re-
spondent’s prior belief about the change in the unemployment rate in her group during the Great Recession. In
addition to the baseline controls, Panels D-F include fixed effects for different sets of interactions of demographic
characteristics: Panel D includes cell fixed effects based on interactions of sex, two age groups, two education
groups, and seven occupation groups. Panel E includes cell fixed effects based on interactions of sex, two age
groups, two education groups and 22 occupation groups. Panel F includes cell fixed effects based on interactions
of sex, two age groups, two income groups and seven occupation groups. In Panels D, E and F, we report the
number of demographic cells as well as the number of cells in which we have at least 10 respondents in our
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